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In recent years, we have observed an increase in sovereign debt on countries such 
as the PIIGS (Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain). This led investors to, 
gradually start to refuge their investments in safer countries like Germany. That is why, 
this is a hot topic in economic policy debate since the beginning of the crisis and 
represents an important issue for those who invest in these countries.  
In this work we intend to study how did the public debt risk for PIIGS progressed, 
comparatively with Germany in different yields (2, 5 and 10 years), between 2000 and 
2013. To measure this risk we used a well know measure, called Value at Risk. But, is 
VaR an appropriated valuation method of sovereign debt risks? In that sense, this work 
is innovative. Despite being a very relevant subject, no evidence was found on studies 
done of the use of VaR to measure this type of risk faced by European investors. 
From the point of view of the investor an important issue is performed, what was 
the risk perception, between 2000 and 2002 (period of entry into force of the Euro) and 
between 2002 and 2008 (period pre-crisis)? And after 2008 (financial crisis and 
sovereign debt crisis)? And ultimately, what can explain the debt sovereign crisis in 
terms of credit risks?  
The main conclusions of this work are that PIIGS, present higher volatility, which 
means they are riskier countries, also present higher VaR and low correlation, in 
contrast to what is observed in Germany. Another conclusion reached is that, the results 
are different depending on the period and country. Between 2000 and 2012, for 
Germany was more favourable the longer terms to invest, while for PIIGS was more 
favourable short terms to invest. However, we verify a different trend between 2012 and 
2013. Since the potential loss is higher on long term, is more favourable to invest in 
shorter terms, also for PIIGS and Germany. 
 






Nos recentes anos temos vindo a observar um aumento da dívida soberana nos 
países como os PIIGS (Portugal, Grécia, Irlanda, Itália e Espanha). Isto fez com que os 
investidores, gradualmente começassem a refugiar os seus investimentos em países  
seguros como a Alemanha. É por isso, que este é um tema de extrema importância no 
debate da política económica desde o início da crise e representa um importante ponto 
para os investidores que investem nestes países. 
Neste trabalho, queremos perceber como progrediu o risco da dívida pública para 
os PIIGS, comparativamente com a Alemanha para as diferentes yields (2, 5 e 10 anos), 
entre 2000 e 2013. Para medir este risco usamos uma medida bastante conhecida, 
chamada Value at Risk (VaR). Mas, será este VaR um método de avaliação apropriado 
do risco de dívida soberana? Nesse sentido, este trabalho é inovador. Embora sendo um 
tema muito relevante, nos estudos já realizados não há evidências do uso do VaR para 
medir este tipo de risco sentido pelos investidores Europeus. 
Do ponto de vista do investidor, uma questão importante surge, qual foi a 
percepção do risco, entre 2000 e 2002 (período em que o EURO entrou em vigor), e 
entre 2002 e 2008 (período antes da crise)? E depois de 2008 (crise financeira e crise da 
dívida soberana)? E por fim, o que é que pode explicar a crise da dívida soberana em 
termos de risco de crédito? 
As principais conclusões deste trabalho são que os PIIGS, apresentam uma 
volatilidade elevada, o que significa que são países com maior risco, o que implica um 
elevado VaR e uma baixa correlação em contraste com o que é observado na Alemanha. 
Outra conclusão obtida foi a de que os resultados do VaR são diferentes dependendo do 
país e do período em questão. Entre 2000 e 2012, para a Alemanha era mais favorável 
investir no longo prazo enquanto que para os PIIGS era mais favorável investir no curto 
prazo. Contudo, verificámos uma tendência diferente entre 2012 e 2013. Tendo em 
conta que a perda potencial é maior no longo prazo, é mais favorável investir no curto 
prazo, tanto para os PIIGS como para a Alemanha. 
 
PALAVRAS CHAVE: Risco, Value at Risk, Risco Soberano, Dívida Publica, 
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The public debt sustainability of finances refers to the ability and willingness of a 
country to repay its debt. Since the financial crisis, and more recent, the Europe 
sovereign crisis this has been a frequently discusses and relevant topic. In recent years, 
we have observed an increase in sovereign debt in countries such as PIIGS
1
. We see that 
investors gradually began to refuge their investments in safer countries such as 
Germany. For this reason, this topic represents an important issue for those who invest 
in these countries, because it allows us to reach some conclusions, observing the risk 
that public debt is really facing, which is consistent with performance presented by each 
country.  
The main purpose of this work is to answer an important question: how the public 
debt risk of the PIIGS progressed comparatively with Germany for different yields, 
between 2000 and 2013? To answer this main question, is necessary to understand some 
current European issues. From the point of view of the investor an important issue is 
performed: what was the risk perception, between 2000 and 2002 (period of entry into 
force of the Euro) and between 2002 and 2008 (period pre-crisis)? And after 2008 
(financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis)? And, what can explain the debt sovereign 
crisis in terms of credit risks? And finally, is VaR an appropriated valuation method of 
sovereign debt risks? 
For this objective, the following countries chosen, were the PIIGS, because they 
are facing serious fiscal constraints, which are reflected by the high yield, demanded 
from the government bonds of these countries. Germany was also chosen due to 
opposite role, since it works as a refuge of those investors. 
Until the recent financial crisis of 2008, yields between the PIIGS and Germany 
remain much closed. Yet, in the last years, particularly with the sovereign debt crisis 
                                                 
1 To have a better perception of the increase in each country, see figure 3 in appendix. 
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 2 
since 2010, PIIGS yields in secondary market have significantly increased, while at the 
same time, investors refuge in German Bonds. Why has the market perception of risk 
changed so abruptly? 
In financial mathematics and risk management, VaR emerged as one of the most 
intuitive, comprehensive and commonly used risk measures of potential loss on a 
portfolio of financial instruments. It measures the worst expected loss of a portfolio 
over a given time horizon at a given level of confidence. Every assessment of public 
finance sustainability contains uncertainty; the use of VaR framework for sustainability 
takes into consideration uncertainty, when forecasting future values of relevant 
variables such as public debt. 
The main conclusions of this work are that PIIGS, present higher volatility, which 
means they are riskier countries, also present higher VaR and low correlation, in 
contrast to what is observed in Germany. Another conclusion reached is that, the results 
are different depending on the period and country. For instance, between 2000 and 
2012, for Germany was more favourable the longer terms to invest, while for PIIGS was 
more favourable shorter terms to invest. However, we verify a different trend between 
2012 and 2013. Since the potential loss is higher on long term, is more favourable to 
invest in shorter terms, also for PIIGS and Germany. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is about literature 
review on sovereign risk. In Section 3 the methodology is developed and a descriptive 
analysis of the data is performed. Section 4 is related to the analysis and the discussion 
of main results and the last Section 5 relates to the findings achieved. 
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 What is Risk? 
“Although in modern parlance the term risk has come to mean “danger of loss”, 
finance theory defines risks as the dispersion of unexpected outcomes due to movements 
in financial variables.”  (Jorion, 2001) 
Jorion (2001) also defined Risk, as the uncertainty of outcomes and it is the best 
measure in terms of probability distribution function. On Reuters Glossary
2
, Risk is 




 wrote a statement which is a very famous definition of risk: “To 
preserve the distinction … between the measurable uncertainty and an unmeasurable 
one we may use the term “risk” to designate the former and the term “uncertainty” for 
the latter.” He also said that,  “The word “risk” is ordinarily used in a loose way to 
refer to any sort of uncertainty viewed from the standpoint of the unfavourable 
contingency…” 
Damodaran (2003) said that those who are exposed to risk, can have negative 
consequences, but, those who use it to advantage, risk is the reason for higher returns. 
”Risk can be both a threat to a firm’s financial health and an opportunity to get ahead 
of the competition” (Damodaran, 2003). 
Financial risks can be defined as the possibility of losses in financial market, due 
to interest rate movements or defaults on financial obligations. Giesecke (2002) added 
that, financial risks refer to unexpected adverse changes in the market value of some 
financial position, for example a single bond, stock, option, or other derivative, or a 
portfolio of various securities. 
                                                 
2 http://glossary.reuters.com/index.php?title=Risk 
3 See Holton G. (2004) 
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Risk in finance can also be viewed as the variance in actual returns around the 
expected return (Damodaran, 2008). It measures an investment’s variability of returns, 
that is, its volatility in relation to its average return. In academic terms, a high volatility 
implies a high degree of risk. 
According to Jorion (2001), there are five categories of financial risks, which are: 
market risks, liquidity risks, operational risks, legal risks and credit risks. 
Market risk is due to variations movements in level or volatility of market prices 
(Jorion, 2001). Giesecke (2002) said, for a bond for example, that market risk arises 
from the variability of interest rates. Others risks associated to market risk are currency 
risk, equity risk, commodity risk and volatility risk.  
Liquidity risk refers to the inability to adjust positions at current market rates or 
increased funding costs (Giesecke, 2002). Jorion (2001), added that it can take two 
different but related forms: asset liquidity risk (or market/product liquidity risk) that 
arises when a transaction cannot be conducted at prevailing market prices due to the 
size of the position relative to normal trading lots. And funding liquidity risk (or cash 
flow risk) that refers to the inability to meet payments obligations, which may force 
early liquidation.  
Operational risk corresponds to the possibility of mistakes, like human and 
technical errors or accidents (such as fraud, management failure and inadequate 
procedures and controls) as referred by Jorion (2001). Operational risks also can lead to 
credit risk with sources other than inadequate funding and market risk with a change in 
market factors.  
Jorion (2001) stated that Legal risk arises when a transaction proves to be not 
applicable in law. It is related to credit risk since counterparties that lose money on a 
transaction may try to find legal grounds for invalidating the transaction. 
Finally, Credit risk is the risk that counterparties may be unwilling or unable to 
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fulfil in their contractual obligations. Credit risk includes the sovereign risk, which is 
the risk associated to the sovereign debt. It refers to country-specific, while default risk 
is normally company-specific as mentioned by Jorion (2001). Therefore, it is necessary 
to understand the concept of sovereign risk. The next subchapter address that issue. 
2.2 What is Sovereign Risk? 
Most of sovereign debt takes the form of bonds, and as in this analysis are used 
government bond yields, the concept of Sovereign debt is therefore quite relevant. 
Financial Times
4
 defines Sovereign debt as the debt that is issued by a national 
government; the government can employ different measures to guarantee repayment 
e.g. increase taxes or print money, so theoretically it’s consider risk-free. Oxford 
Dictionaries
5
 defines Sovereign debt as “the amount of money that a country’s 
government has borrowed, typically issued as bonds denominated in a reserve 
currency”. Or, according to Das et al (2012a) refers to debt issued or guaranteed by the 
government of a sovereign state. 
As stated before, credit risk includes the sovereign risk, that is the risk associated 
to the sovereign debt.  
Firstly, according to Reuters Glossary
6
, credit risk is the possibility that a bond 
issuer or other borrower will default and fail to pay the principal and interest when due.  
For a bond, the creditworthiness of its issuer, for example a (sovereign) government or a 
corporation, affects the bond price, since it is uncertain whether the issuer will be able 
to fulfil his obligations (coupon, principal repayment) or not (Giesecke, 2002). 
According to Manganelli and Engle (2001), credit risk refers to the potential loss 
through the incapacity of a counterpart to comply its obligations, which can be because 
of credit exposure, probability of default or loss in the event of default. 
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Secondly, Reuters Glossary defines that “Sovereign risk refers to the risk that a 
government or an agency backed by a government will not pay the interest according to 
the terms of a loan agreement and instead will default”.  
2.3 Literature on sovereign risk 
Literature on sovereign risk is scares, despite the relevance of the theme. 
However, some authors like Bruder at al (2011), Gapen et al (2008), Sgherri and Zoli 
(2009), Afonso et al (2012a), Afonso and Nunes (2012b), Baldacci and Kumar (2010) 
and Aizenman et al (2011), wrote about sovereign risk assessment, that it is described 
later. In this section is described some literature on sovereign risk. 
Das et al (2012b) argued that the key legacy of Global financial crisis is that 
sovereign risk is more than just a pure fiscal risk. They define Sovereign risk as a 
complex combination of risks that feed a number of channels into the sovereign balance 
sheet in a non-monotonic fashion
7
. They propose expanding the concepts developed in 
the macro-fiscal and macro-prudential literature to incorporate the macro-financial risks 
that sovereigns face. For instance, credit risk from systemic financial institutions will 
lead through the contingent liabilities component of the sovereign balance sheet, while 
market risk will affect the fiscal revenue and international reserves components. 
Castillo (2004) defined sovereign risk as the risk that the government will not 
service its debt in full and on time and its analysis is related to the ability, flexibility and 
willingness that the government has to take appropriate policy measures to ease its debt 
servicing.   
As stated by Gapen et al (2008), the most important type of risk in sovereign risk 
is the risk of default, so they considered that sovereign default is a result of accumulated 
distress and the risk of sovereign default is determined by the interaction of value of 
                                                 
7 See Figure 4, Das U. et al (2012), “Sovereign Risk: A Macro-Financial Perspective”. ADBI Working Paper Series, paper no. 383 
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sovereign assets, asset volatility and leverage. 
2.4 Sovereign Risk Assessment 
There are different types of studies according the different approaches used, using 
different inputs for the assessment of sovereign risk. However, there are not studies 
done on this subject using VaR.  
The major studies available on this subject typically, have the same data used on 
this thesis, some countries of European Monetary Union are the same, and the period in 
analysis is the same (before, during and after the global financial crisis), but were done 
with different factors, namely Government bond yields spreads, Credit Default Swaps, 
ratings and were measured by econometric tests. The main objective of these studies is 
to assess if some fundamentals (macro, fiscal, liquidity risk, international risk) 
explained well the Government bond yields spreads and the other factors.  
There is a substantial amount of literature on this subject, but the results are 
uneven, since there are many factors that may influence the sovereign spreads. On the 
appendix are listed some of the studies on a conceptual framework (table IV), that 
contributed to literature exploring alternative methodologies to measure and analyse 
sovereign risk.  
For instance, Bruder et al (2011), present a useful framework to measure and 
analyse the sovereign risk of a bond portfolio. They define credit risk of a bond 
portfolio as the volatility of the CDS basket, that perfectly hedge the sovereign risk of 
the portfolio, which allows to compute the sovereign risk contribution of each country 
and monitor it across time. They concluded that indexation based on risk budgeting 
techniques is an efficient alternative compared to the traditional capitalisation-based 
approach to indexation. Also concluded that it is not enough and must be complemented 
by risk-based methods.  
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Gapen et al (2008) developed a new framework based on contingent claims that 
allows to measure and to analyse risk arising from the public sector (government and 
monetary authorities) balance sheet. The contingent claims are used to construct a 
marked to market balance sheet (that provides a structural framework that identifies 
balance sheet risks, incorporates uncertainty, and yields quantifiable risk indicators) and 
derive a set of forward-looking credit risk indicators that serve as a barometer of 
sovereign risk. They developed a set of risk indicators, like, distance to distress, risk- 
neutral probability of default, sovereign risk neutral credit spreads and value of senior 
foreign currency debt to measure sovereign balance sheet risk. Another step used by 
them is the Monte Carlo simulations and it is used to yield probability distributions and 
confidence intervals for the set of sovereign credit risk indicators. Sovereign bond 
spreads, spreads on sovereign CDS and implied probabilities from CDS markets. 
The risk indicators when applied to a sample of emerging market economies 
shows to be robust and significant when compared with market observed credit spreads 
on foreign currency debt, even though the spreads were not used as inputs. This means 
that the level and variation of forward exchange rates and other market variables contain 
valuable information for analysing sovereign credit risk, which gives a stand for the 
approach used. The main results of this study include sovereign credit risk indicators 
(forward-looking market prices and nonlinear changes in values) and should have 
greater predictive power in estimating sovereign credit risk than would traditional 
macroeconomic vulnerability indicators or accounting-based ratios, sensitivity 
measures, and sovereign VaR.  
Sgherri and Zoli (2009) used the spreads on yield on 10Y government bonds over 
Bunds, for some euro area members, together with by downgrades of sovereign debt 
ratings for three countries, Greece, Spain and Portugal and an alert for Ireland. This 
study is concerned about fiscal policies, default risk and global risk. These authors 
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concluded that fiscal policies through the use of public balance sheet are an important 
support in order to strengthen the financial system. The need to higher sovereign default 
risk premiums, for most countries, means that financial markets have answered to the 
significant deterioration in fiscal positions. Also concluded that global risks also played 
a significant role in explaining movements in euro area sovereign interest rate 
differentials.   
According to Afonso et al (2012a), there are some studies on EMU government 
bond yields or their spread against Germany, that identified three main determinants of 
sovereign risk that are: first, the international risk factor, that captures the level of 
financial risk and unit prices, second is credit risk reflecting the probability of default 
normally used indicators of past or future fiscal performance, and third government 
bond yields are linked to liquidity risk. These authors used a set of fundaments that are 
relevant for EMU members, as, macroeconomic and expected fiscal fundamentals, 
international risk, liquidity conditions and the risk of the crisis’ transmission among 
EMU member states. They analyse three distinct time periods: first, the period 
preceding the global credit crunch (1999.01 – 2007.07); second, the period during 
which the global credit crunch had not yet mutated into a sovereign debt crisis (2007.08 
– 2009.02); and third, the period during which the global financial crisis mutated into a 
sovereign debt crisis (2009.03 – 2010.12).  
The conclusions of this study are different according to the periods defined 
previously, namely, during the pre-crisis period macro and fiscal fundamentals are 
usually not significant in explaining spreads. On the other hand, since summer 2007 the 
previous fundamentals explained spread movements well and were consistent with 
theoretical expectations. Additionally, the menu of fundamentals that are statistically 
significant in explaining spreads is supplemented since spring 2009, suggesting that 
markets are now pricing risks (risk of crisis transmission among the countries of the 
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European periphery, as well as from the periphery countries to the countries of the 
European core) which they did not consider previously, even within the crisis period. In 
contrast to the pre-crisis period, markets are now pricing the size, liquidity and maturity 
of debt issuances. Finally, sovereign credit ratings are statistically significant in 
explaining spreads, yet relative to macro- and fiscal fundamentals, their role has been 
rather limited. 
Afonso and Nunes (2012b) performed an econometric analysis of the linkages 
between different economic forecasts and sovereign yield spreads, using 10-year 
government bond yields and considering as determinants the GDP real growth rate, the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio, the budget balance ratio, the inflation rate, given by the 
harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP), the real effective exchange rate, the 
current account balance, also as a percentage of GDP, the international risk, and 
monetary policy. The main conclusion is that corrections (particularly the corrections in 
fiscal variables- public debt and budget balance) in the European Comission forecasts 
do impinge on the 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads. This impact is different across 
countries, being more evident in countries with less favourable economic conditions. 
Higher credibility means yields will react less to changes in forecasts. 
Baldacci and Kumar (2010), with data from 31 developed and in developing 
countries, between 1980 and 2008, examine the impact of fiscal deficits and public debt 
on long-term interest rates. The main result obtained is that the impact of fiscal 
deterioration on long-term interest rates is significant and robust but nonlinear. 
Basically, higher deficits and levels of public debt lead to a significant increase in long- 
term interest rates, and that the magnitude of such increase depends on the initial fiscal, 
institutional and structural conditions, and on the spillovers of the global financial 
markets.  
Aizenman et al (2011) pricing sovereign risk for sixty countries based on fiscal 
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space (debt/tax and deficits/tax) and other economic fundamentals since 2005 to 2010. 
Their objective is to determine if the perception of relatively high sovereign default risk 
of the Euro area countries as seen in market pricing of CDS spreads focusing in 
particular on the five countries in the South-West Eurozone Periphery (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain), may be explained by existing past or current fundamentals 
of debt and deficits relative to tax revenue. 
 They find evidences that market-priced risk of sovereign debt as measured by 
CDS spreads is partly explained by fiscal space and other economic determinants. In 
addition to validating that fiscal space is an important determinant of market-based 
sovereign risk, find evidence of mispricing in SWEAP given current fiscal space and 
other current fundamentals: unpredicted low CDS in a quite period and unpredicted 
high during global crisis period, especially 2010 when sovereign debt crisis swept over 
Euro area. 
They also found that SWEAP default risk is priced much higher than the 
“matched” (5 middle- income countries outside Europe, the ones close in terms of fiscal 
space (debt/tax)) countries in 2010, even allowing for differentials in fiscal space and 
other fundamentals. Their interpretation for the results is that market-priced risk of 
sovereign default follows waves of contagion, overreacting and mispricing risk of 
sovereign default over a period of several years. The extremely high CDS spreads in 
SWEAP in 2010, largely unpredicted by the model, can be explained by excessive 
pessimism and an overreaction to the fiscal deterioration. Other possible interpretation 
is that, CDS market is pricing default risk not primarily on current fundamentals but 
future fundamentals, expecting the SWEAP fiscal space to deteriorate markedly. The 
adjustment challenges of the SWEAP may be viewed as economically and politically 
more difficult due to exchange rate inflexibility associated with participation in the Euro 
area that is not a constraint in the matched group of the middle income countries. 
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2.5 Main Findings 
The main findings can be summarised in the following steps: 1) Indexation based 
on risk budgeting techniques is an efficient alternative compared to the traditional 
capitalisation-based approach to indexation, but must be complemented by risk-based 
methods; 2) The sovereign credit risk indicators like forward-looking market prices and 
nonlinear changes in values should have greater predictive power in estimating 
sovereign credit risk than would traditional macroeconomic vulnerability indicators or 
accounting-based ratios, sensitivity measures, and sovereign VaR; 3) Fiscal policies 
through the use of public balance sheet help to reinforce the financial system. The 
higher sovereign default risk premiums means that financial markets have answered to 
the significant deterioration in fiscal positions. And global risks also played a 
significant role in explaining movements in euro area sovereign interest rate 
differentials; 4) During the pre-crisis period macro and fiscal fundamentals are not 
significant in explaining spreads, on the other hand, since 2007 that fundamentals 
explain very well spread movements and in 2009 fundamentals are supplemented, 
suggesting that markets are now pricing risks. In contrast to the pre-crisis period, in 
2009 markets price the size, liquidity and maturity of debt issuances and sovereign 
credit ratings are statistically significant in explaining spreads, yet relative to macro- 
and fiscal fundamentals, their role has been rather limited; 5) The corrections in fiscal 
variables- public debt and budget balance in the EC’s forecasts do impinge on the 10-
year sovereign bond yield spreads, this impact is more evident in countries with less 
favourable economic conditions, it was also concluded that higher credibility means that 
yields will react less to changes in forecasts; 6) Market-priced risk of sovereign debt as 
measured by CDS spreads is partly explained by fiscal space and other economic 
determinants, SWEAP default risk is priced much higher than the five middle- income 
countries outside Europe, the ones close in terms of fiscal space (debt/tax)) countries in 
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2010, even allowing for differentials in fiscal space and other fundamentals. This can 
mean that market-priced risk of sovereign default follows waves of contagion, 
overreacting and mispricing risk of sovereign default over a period of several years. The 
CDS market is priced the default risk, not primarily on current fundamentals but on 
future fundamentals, expecting the SWEAP fiscal space to deteriorate markedly. 
  
III. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
The research methodology will be based on VaR framework using Yield to 
Maturity and benchmark prices for six countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain 
and Germany) using three different maturities (two, five and ten years). The purpose of 
this study is to find out what is the degree of public sovereign risk. Or better, what was 
the risk perception, from the investor perspective, between 2000 and 2002 (period of 
entry into force of the Euro), between 2002 and 2008 (period pre-crisis) and after 2008 
(financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis)? But, is VaR an appropriated valuation 
method of sovereign debt risks? What can explain the debt sovereign crisis in terms of 
credit risks? For this purpose were collected the YTM and the benchmark prices since 
2000 until now. So as to measure that risk was employed VaR.  
3.2 Statistical Analysis Methodology 
This study will be complemented with some statistical measures, using yields data 
from 2000 to 2012. This will allow us to better understand the behaviour of each 
individual country during this period. 
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3.2.1 Statistics Measures  
The first statistics measures that will be computed are, mean, standard error, 
median, mode, standard deviation, sample variance, kurtosis, asymmetry, interval, 
maximum and minimum value, sum, count and confidence level.  
3.2.2 Covariance and Correlation Matrices 
The second measures that will be computed are the covariance and correlation 
matrices. By define two variables X and Y, being the average respectively E(X) and 
E(Y) and variance Var(X) and Var(Y), the covariance and correlation can be 
algebraically represented as: 
 
Eq. 1     (   )  [ ( )   (  )][ ( )   (  )]   (  )   ( ) ( )  
Eq. 2       (   )  
   (  )
   ( )    ( )
       
3.2.2.1 Covariance Matrix 
Covariance is a statistical measure of the variance of two random variables that 
are observed or measured in the same time period. Or, can be defined as a non-
standardized measure of the degree of relationship between two variables. 
According to Hull (2011), in a covariance matrix the entry in the i
th
 row and j
th
 
column is the covariance between variable i and j. The covariance between a variable 
and itself is its variance, thus, the diagonal matrix are variances, like the correlation 
matrix, it is symmetric.  
A positive covariance indicates that the two variables move in the same direction; 
a negative covariance indicates that the variables move in the opposite direction. A 
covariance equal to zero means that the two variables are independent (unrelated). 
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3.2.2.2 Correlation Matrix 
According to Hull (2011) the correlation matrix give us the correlation     




 column. The diagonal of the matrix 
is always 1 since a variable is always perfectly correlated with itself. Since the          
the correlation matrix is symmetric.  
 
Figure 1- An example of a Correlation Matrix 
    (   )  [
          
          
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
 
] 
Source: Hull, 2011. 
 
The idea behind correlation is to measure the relationship between two or 
more variables, in this case between all six countries studied. If two countries are 
correlated, it means that they move together. On one hand, positive correlation means 
that high (low) YTM on one country is associated with high (low) YTM on the other 
country. One the other hand, negative correlation means that high (low) YTM on the 
first country is associated with low (high) YTM on the second. It is a standardized 
measure of the relationship between two variables and can be computed through the 
covariance. 
3.3 Value at Risk Methodology 
Historically
8
, financial companies introduced VaR in the late 80’s. Since then, this 
method has become an essential/popular element in the toolkit among specialists, the 
academic community and central banks, because it provides a quantitative measure of 
                                                 
8 For more details about historical development of VaR see Holton G. (2002), Duffie and Pan [1997] and Linsmeier and 
Pearson [2000]. 
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downside measure. According to Jorion (2001) it is a method of assessing risk that uses 
standard statistic techniques routinely used in other technical fields.   
Based on literature, we can define VaR as a risk measure, it is a technique used to 
estimate the probability of a portfolio losses based on the statistical analysis of 
historical price (or yield) trends and volatilities.  
For investors, risk is related to the probability of losing money, and VaR is based 
on that common-sense fact. Assuming investors care about the probability of a really 
big loss, institutional investors use VaR to evaluate portfolio risk.  
As stated by Manganelli and Engle (2001), the reputation that this measure 
achieved is essentially due to its conceptual simplicity. VaR reduces the risk associated 
with any portfolio to just one number that is the loss associated to a given probability, 
for this reason it has become a widely accepted standard.  
For some authors, VaR has become a standard measure used by financial analysts 
to quantify market risk, although some of them, namely Duffie and Pan (1997) 
considered that credit risk should be included on market risk. Jorion (2001), adds that, 
although in the beginning VaR was considered a method to measure financial market 
risk, now it is being used to control and manage risk actively, both credit and 
operational risk. VaR happens to control financial risks.   
A definition of VaR given by Jorion (2001) is: “VaR summarizes the worst loss 
over a target horizon with a given confidence level”.  
“VaR is defined as the maximum potential change in value of a portfolio of 
financial instruments with a given probability over a certain horizon” (Manganelli and 
Engle, 2001). 
Pearson and Linsmeier (1996) defines VaR as: “Using a probability of x% and a 
holding period of t days, an entity’s value at risk is the loss that is expected to be 
exceeded with a probability of only x % during the next t day holding period”. 
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A VaR statistics is composed by three components: a time period (day, month or 
year), a confidence level (usually 95% or 99%) and a loss amount (expressed either in 
euros or in percentages). As mentioned by Hull (2011) the variable V is the VaR of the 
portfolio and it is a function of two parameters, the time horizon (N days) and the 
confidence level (X%). When VaR is computed, it is intended to make a statement in the 
following form: “We are X% certain that we will not lose more than Y euros or 
percentage in the next N days”.  
In practice and to realize better each measure, Hull (2011) stated that for N days 
horizon and X% of confidence level, VaR is the loss corresponding to the (100-X)
th
 
percentile of the distribution of the change in the value of the portfolio over the next N 
days. For instance, if we want to know how much our portfolio can lose with a 
confidence level of 95%, we examine the (100-95)% VaR value, as we can see in figure 
2. Bellow are described the HS Method used to compute VaR and Volatility.  
 
Figure 2- VaR curve
 
Source: Hull, 2011. 
 
3.3.1 Estimating VaR through Historical Simulation Methodology 
The Historical Simulation
 
approach development by Hull (2011) is a procedure to 
predict the VaR by building the HS of YTM and price changes. This model does not 
Gain (loss) over N days 
(100-X)% 
VaR loss 
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require any distributional assumption. This is a non-parametric method because, unlike 
other approaches, the VaR’s calculation does not implicate to have an estimation of the 
parameters of a theoretical distribution, such as normal. 
The main statement under this method is to look back at the past performance of 
our portfolio and make the supposition that the past observations are a good indicator of 
the near-future prices, this means, that the recent past will reproduce itself in the near-
future.  
The main steps to apply this method are to measure daily percentage changes in 
the price, after applying these changes to the portfolio and measure the corresponding 
profits and losses. Third, organize actual historical returns, putting them in order from 
worst to best and after ordering all the resulting data, set the level of VaR at the 5% and 
1% quantile of worst outcomes. 
For this valuation was used a set of complete elements, such as YTM and 
benchmark prices. Defining vi as the value of a market variable on day i and suppose 
that today is day n, the hypothetical i
th
 scenario futures prices are obtained from 
applying historical changes in prices (or yields) to the current level of prices (or yields) 
like: 
 
Eq. 3                              
  
    
        
There are no 100% perfect models and HS is not an exception. The advantages are 
actually easy calculation, easy implementation and execution, low operating cost and 
stability results. This method allows the use of actual data for the creation of 
distribution of returns for the next N days and it does not does not assume any 
distribution on the asset returns. The fat tails of the distribution and other extreme 
events (outliers) are captured as long as they are contained in the dataset.  
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However, also present disadvantages, namely the fact that there are some 
deficiencies. First of all, it imposes a restriction on the estimation assuming asset 
returns are independent and identically distributed (iid). Therefore it can be unrealistic 
to assume iid asset returns. Second restriction is related to time, because HS is 
indifferent to the time, it applies equal weight to all returns of the complete period, this 
means, that an observation of yesterday accounts the same as an observation of two or 
three years ago. This is incompatible with the nature of the decrease in forecast data that 
are further away from the present. 
3.4 Estimating Volatility (using Historical Simulation Methodology) 
We can define volatility as a measure of risk based on standard deviation of the 
asset. It is a statistical measure of the dispersion of return for a particular security or 
market index. Normally, a higher volatility implies a riskier security. 
As asset prices are volatile, volatility measures that change of price over time. 
Were used historical prices to measure the historical volatility and is easily calculated 
using rudimentary statistical software. 
After, it is described the standard method to estimate volatility from historical 
data according to Hull (2011).  Defining    as the volatility of a market variable on day 
n, as estimated at the end of day n-1. The variance rate is the squared of the volatility   
  
on day n. Defining Si as the value of the market variable at the end of day i, we can 
obtain the continuously compounded daily returns on a financial asset (between the end 
of day i-1 and end of day i) that is represented by       
  
    
 .    
Defining  ̅  as the average of daily returns (expected return). The sum of the 
differences gives us the return: 
Eq. 4     ∑ (    ̅)
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The historical standard deviation over the last n days is equal to (there are many 
other ways to represent the following expression): 
Eq. 5      √
 
   
∑ (    ̅) 
 
         
The last step is to compute the estimated annualized volatility by: 
Eq. 6    ̂      √     
3.5 Data in Analysis 
The dataset consists of daily data of government bond yields and benchmark 
prices for maturities of 2, 5 and 10 years for PIIGS and Germany. 
The data for government bond yields were collected from Bloomberg and refers to 
the period from 2000:01- 2013:12. This time frame allows to study the period of entry 
into force of the Euro, the pre-crisis period and financial crisis period. Later the sample 
is divided into three sub-periods [Jan2000- 31December of 2001] and [1Jan2002-
31Dec2007] and the last one [1Jan2008-31Dec20012] in order to see if conclusions 
change from one period to the other.  
 The benchmark prices were collected from Reuters and the period in analysis was 
shorter (from September 2012 till May 2013) because has limited information available, 
but it is enough for the second analysis done on this work. 
 
IV. Analysis and Discussion of Results 
4.1 Statistic Analysis 
4.1.1 Principal Statistics 
In this work we performed some statistics that allow us to confirm some empirical 
results and understand better some values about the data used in this dissertation. This 
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statistics measures were applied to each country (see appendix, table V). The main 
results are described below. 
First, from short (2Y YTM) to long maturity (10Y YTM), we found that the 
means of YTM for all countries increases, except in Greece; we also verify that the 
higher sample variance is related to Greece for all maturities. This is related to the fact 
that, with the Greek crisis the level of uncertainty in short term has become higher. 
Also from short to long maturity, the standard deviation decreases for all 
countries, which means that uncertainty is higher in short term. And thence, presumably 
be more favourable for investors to invest in long term.  
In Kurtosis terms, we can conclude that there are no normal distributions 
(Mesokurtic distribution, that means Kurtosis is equal to three) of YTM results, which 
is consistent with the assumptions of the model. The YTM more close to normal 
distributions are the 10Y of Portugal and Ireland. We can also observe that there are 
three countries (Portugal, Ireland and Greece) that show a Kurtosis higher than three, 
which is a Leptokurtic distribution, with values concentrated around the means and 
thicker tails. This means that there is a high probability for the occurrence of extreme 
values. The other three countries (Germany, Italy and Spain) show a Kurtosis lower 
than three, which implies a Platykurtic distribution (flatter than normal distribution with 
a wider peak). The probability of extreme values is less than for a normal distribution, 
and the values are wider spread around the mean.  
The difference between the minimum and the maximum for YTM is higher for all 
maturities in Greece, which confirms the final results achieved for this country. The 
confidence level at 95% is low for Germany, Italy and Spain and higher for Portugal, 
Ireland and Greece.  
In terms of sum of all YTM for 2Y, Greece shows the higher sum, which proves 
the evidence of higher sovereign debt. 
HOW DID THE PUBLIC DEBT RISK OF THE PIIGS (PORTUGUESE, IRELAND, ITALY, GREECE AND SPAIN) 
PROGRESSED COMPARED TO GERMANY FOR DIFFERENT YIELDS, BETWEEN 2000 AND 2013? 
 
 22 
4.1.2 Covariance Matrix Results 
Looking for the covariance matrix there are several results that are important to 
refer, namely the numbers with higher and lower covariance. 
Table I - Covariance matrix (2000- 2012) 
 
Source: Own computations.  
Legend: Green: higher values of Covariance, Yellow: Covariance near to 0, Red: lower values of Covariance. 
 
All covariance’s are dependent (covariance different to zero), which means that 
all of the six countries are not independent from each other, in other words, each 
country affects the others countries. However, there is a low covariance (approximately 
zero) between 2Y YTM of Germany and 10Y YTM of Spain (-0,029) and also between 
10Y YTM of Germany and 10Y YTM of Spain (-0,038).  
All numbers with higher covariance have in common the same country, Greece. 
For example, the higher covariance is presented between 5Y and 2Y YTM of Greece 
(907,90). Also between 5Y and 5Y YTM of Greece (245,02) and between 10Y and 2Y 
YTM of Greece (327,07). Between Greece and Portugal, there are also higher values for 
covariance, 2Y YTM of Greece and 5Y and 10Y YTM of Portugal (125,62; 105,40). 
Which means that there is a contagion effect between the maturities in Greece, for 
instance, the increases in spreads on shorter terms, implied increases in spreads on 
longer terms and vice versa. And also for the YTM between Greece and Portugal, for 
instance, when 2Y YTM of Greece gets worse, investors assume that 5Y YTM of 
Portugal will also get worse and vice versa.  
Ireland
2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y
2y 10.8151
5y 9.995006 10.07611
10y 7.028912 7.32222 5.583137
2y 7.750795 6.926414 4.642419 6.351061
5y 4.805099 4.487747 3.144173 5.114752 3.473557
10y 4.349146 4.647904 3.689671 3.903007 2.664226 3.23502
2y 1.569098 1.071104 0.614917 1.193899 0.774062 0.172584 1.172217
5y 1.74476 1.509568 1.072511 1.227402 0.900406 0.598051 0.870127 0.768415
10y 1.493714 1.453146 1.120001 0.989219 0.783336 0.719534 0.53834 0.566094 0.486987
2y 101.3416 125.6219 105.4045 27.22647 27.66209 62.12311 0.946305 14.27293 18.11126 3456.71
5y 31.56799 37.29276 30.83448 12.33779 10.32039 19.2854 0.627858 4.325925 5.354348 907.9029 245.0204
10y 17.94883 19.23286 14.96047 9.903276 6.890366 9.39601 0.894803 2.371435 2.71062 327.0745 93.7343 44.67277
2y 1.314779 0.987656 0.656451 1.088961 0.744011 0.36952 1.027431 0.781431 0.494869 6.719367 2.077128 1.054782 1.018929
5y 1.491862 1.402356 1.084404 1.215942 0.906039 0.804983 0.733747 0.675483 0.514341 18.00999 5.311448 2.385938 0.77076 0.713745
10y 1.513857 1.604254 1.327291 1.136554 0.90454 1.026846 0.462351 0.544036 0.495214 25.59018 7.397896 3.220908 0.526909 0.602161 0.611808
2y -1.28876 -1.86804 -1.67714 -0.47126 -0.29943 -1.2914 0.999313 0.477154 0.111698 -48.75 -13.8917 -5.97887 0.865029 0.361058 -0.02912 2.053666
5y -1.44106 -1.89396 -1.63641 -0.54939 -0.31743 -1.17268 0.730278 0.332096 0.067472 -49.1848 -13.8145 -5.75092 0.609632 0.228597 -0.06252 1.740136 1.549464
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Relatively to the negative covariance, the higher negative values are between 2Y, 
5Y and 10Y YTM of Germany and 2Y of Greece. And the other ones are between 2Y, 
5Y YTM of Germany and 5Y of Greece. In this case, the negative values mean that 
when YTM of Germany goes down, the YTM of Greece goes rise, they move in 
opposite directions. Which is not a surprise, this confirms the opposite situation of each 
country where Germany presents low YTM and Greece high YTM.  
Looking in more detail for the period of financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis 
(2008-2012), the covariance matrix (see appendix, table VII) allows us to conclude that 
results consistently support the previous. 
4.1.3 Correlation Matrix Results 
Looking for matrix of correlation were analysed the values closest to the 
following cases: negatively correlated (-1), positively correlated (+1) and the 
uncorrelated (0).   
Table II - Correlation Matrix (2000- 2012) 
 
Source: Own computations.  
Legend: Green: higher values of Covariance, Yellow: Covariance near to 0, Red: lower values of Covariance. 
 
Starting by negative correlated values, the values close to -1 are all linked to 
Germany and Greece. Which denotes exactly the different reality experienced by each 
country, these mean that the YTM of Germany does not move together to the YTM of 
Greece, when YTM of Greece increases, the YTM of Germany decreases.  For instance, 
the 5Y YTM of Germany is negative correlated with 5Y YTM of Greece (-0,70899). 
Ireland
2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y
2y 1
5y 0.957462 1
10y 0.904552 0.976241 1
2y 0.798207 0.739042 0.663938 1
5y 0.783971 0.758568 0.71397 0.939744 1
10y 0.735276 0.81409 0.868181 0.737479 0.794777 1
2y 0.440688 0.31166 0.240366 0.46543 0.383605 0.088625 1
5y 0.605233 0.542511 0.517803 0.591379 0.551129 0.379316 0.916813 1
10y 0.650869 0.656 0.679236 0.572617 0.602285 0.573263 0.712515 0.925406 1
2y 0.524133 0.673112 0.758732 0.157996 0.252445 0.587467 0.014866 0.276939 0.441427 1
5y 0.61324 0.750545 0.833674 0.270162 0.353759 0.684998 0.037047 0.315268 0.49017 0.986522 1
10y 0.816582 0.906517 0.947294 0.508083 0.553138 0.781598 0.123652 0.404755 0.58115 0.832327 0.895934 1
2y 0.396064 0.308239 0.275227 0.469124 0.395476 0.203529 0.940106 0.883122 0.702521 0.11322 0.131459 0.15634 1
5y 0.53696 0.522926 0.543226 0.608245 0.575424 0.529757 0.802178 0.912105 0.87241 0.362586 0.401643 0.422538 0.903807 1
10y 0.588521 0.646129 0.718157 0.561815 0.620487 0.729893 0.545959 0.793455 0.907249 0.55646 0.604226 0.616097 0.667354 0.911241 1
2y -0.27346 -0.41065 -0.4953 -0.14015 -0.11211 -0.50102 0.644069 0.379836 0.111692 -0.5786 -0.61928 -0.62421 0.59799 0.298223 -0.02598 1
5y -0.35203 -0.47933 -0.55637 -0.1925 -0.13683 -0.52378 0.541868 0.304352 0.077673 -0.67206 -0.70899 -0.69123 0.485182 0.217375 -0.06421 0.975501 1
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Also the 10Y YTM of Germany is negative correlated with all YTM of Greece (2, 5 and 
10 years), by order, -0,69348, -0,72679 and -0,69703.  
These results lead us to the refuge effect. The crisis in Greece led to the flight of 
investors, who refuge their investments in Germany, because of low YTM, and not in 
other countries within the PIIGS. 
On the other hand, the more positive correlated values are between 10Y YTM and 
5Y YTM in Germany (0,98) and also in Portugal (0,976). There is another combination 
of positive correlated values between 5Y and 2Y YTM for three countries, Germany 
(0,975), Portugal (0,957) and Greece (0,986). This positive correlation means that 
values of YTM move together. 
This lead us to the contagion effect on PIIGS and in Germany. For PIIGS, the 
trend shows that with the crisis, the increases in spreads on shorter terms, implied 
increases in spreads on longer terms. On the contrary, the trend in Germany shows that 
the decreases in spreads on shorter terms, implied decreases in spreads on longer terms. 
 Analysing further the results of the correlation matrix, we find that across 
countries there is also the contagion effect, particularly between Portugal and Greece 
and between Spain and Italy. Which means, for instance, when Greece gets worse 
economically, investors assume that Portugal will also get worse and vice versa. The 
same happens between Italy and Spain.  
The low correlation values (close to 0) are linked to Germany in all of cases. The 
values closest to zero are 2Y, 5Y and 10Y YTM of Germany with 10Y YTM of Spain (-
0,025; -0,064; -0,048). The 5Y and 10Y YTM of Germany are less correlated with 10Y 
YTM of Italy (0,077; 0,087). This means that investors are only afraid of Spain and 
Italy in shorter terms. 
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Looking in more detail for the period of financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis 
(2008-2012), the correlation matrix (see appendix, table IX) allows us to conclude that 
results consistently support the previous. 
 
4.2 Value at Risk 
4.2.1 VaR results using yields 
Data used in this work was divided in three different periods (2000 to 2002, 
2002 to 2008 and 2008 to 2012) for the six countries (PIIGS and Germany). The first 
period refers to the period of entry into force of the Euro, the second refers to the period 
pre-crisis and the last refers to the period of financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis.  
In order to evaluate the behaviour of these countries were defined two different 
portfolios, one of PIIGS and another one of Germany and was computed the 95%VaR 
and 99%VaR. 
Table I show us that Germany presents a smaller values of VaR for all cases 
compared to PIIGS, so, the possible loss in Germany is lower, for this period of time. 
For the three different periods analysed, almost always, VaR increased among 
these periods both for PIIGS and Germany, except between 2002 and 2008 but this may 
be related to the fact that the period in question be greater, which decreases the VaR.  
As we said previously, the period prior to the beginning of the crisis, the VaR 
decrease a little, but not significantly to change the low risk associated with this 
sovereign debt.  From 2008 to 2012, as expected, presents a higher VaR, since the 
possible loss is higher during this period of crisis, compared with previous periods. 
This means that the best period to invest was in 2000, in YTM with shorter 
terms for PIIGS and YTM with longer terms for Germany. 
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 Table III- VaR results using yields (2000- 2012) 
 
 
Source: Own computations. 
 
4.2.2 VaR results using yields versus benchmark prices 
In order to better understand what happens to the countries in analysis after 2012 
using the same approach used before, it was computed again the VaR between 2012 and 
2013, also using benchmark. Using the same approach and different information, we 
can compare if results are similar or not.  
First, looking for the last period on table I and for table II, also for 95%VaR and 
99%VaR, we conclude that all values of VaR start to decrease after the critical period of 
crisis. This is related to the fact that markets are recovering their performance and 
therefore the potential loss is lower than in the period of crisis.  
Second, looking for tables I and for table II, we also conclude that now both for 
PIIGS and Germany are better to invest in shorter term. Since financial crisis, Germany 
keeps its strategy and the PIIGS start to change it to reverse theirs performance. 
Comparing the different data using the same approach, table II and III, indicate 
that Germany always presents less VaR and also 95%VaR is lower than 99%VaR, 
because as the number of observations increase, VaR decrease. These two facts are 
consistent with observed in table I. 
As predicted the results are not the same, however, they give us the same 
conclusions. 
VaR 95% PIIGS Germany PIIGS Germany PIIGS Germany
2000-2002 0.278 0.076 0.341 0.072 0.300 0.057
2002-2008 0.265 0.063 0.317 0.066 0.287 0.059
2008-2012 1.202 0.084 0.901 0.102 0.752 0.092
2Y 5Y 10Y
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Table IV- VaR results using yields (2012- 2013) 
 
Source: Own computations. 
 
Table V- VaR results using benchmark prices (2012- 2013) 
 
Source: Own computations. 
 
4.3 Volatility 
From the computations through the HS we obtained the Volatility for all countries 
and all maturities, except the Greece 2Y and 5Y that there are no information. In order 
to construct the Volatility we must have between 90 and 180 days, and the data 
available of benchmark prices that fulfils this requisite is the 10Y data. The range data 
used to compute volatility was between 2012:12 and 2013:05. 
Figure 2 shows us the distribution of 10Y of volatility and as we expected, Greece 
presents the higher volatility, approximately 35%, followed by Portugal and Italy. In the 
opposite side we have Germany with approximately 7%. A higher (less) volatility 
means that the country is riskier (less risky) and this confirms that PIIGS are riskier 
countries. 
According to the theory, figure 4 in appendix is not complete because of the lack 
of information essentially for 2Y and 5Y of Greece. However, analysing the volatility 
for all maturities, we can have an idea of how countries volatility behave. In general for 
all countries, the volatility increases as the maturity increases. Which is in according 
with was observed in the VaR, since for long term the higher volatility imply higher 
VaR. As it was expectable Germany presents the lower volatility among all maturities.  
PIIGS Germany PIIGS Germany PIIGS Germany
VaR 95% 0,525 0,032 0,740 0,059 0,467 0,061
VaR 99% 0,947 0,050 1,495 0,085 1,034 0,104
2Y 5Y 10Y
2012-2013
PIIGS Germany PIIGS Germany PIIGS Germany
VaR 95% 0,008 0,000 0,013 0,000 0,045 0,003
VaR 99% 0,014 0,001 0,021 0,006 0,079 0,008
2Y 5Y 10Y
2012-2013
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Figure 2- 10 years Volatility for PIIGS and Germany 
 




The aim of this thesis is to assess how did the sovereign risk among PIIGS and 
Germany progressed since the beginning of this crisis. Or better, what was the risk 
perception, from the investor perspective, between 2000 and 2002 (period of entry into 
force of the Euro) and between 2002 and 2008 (period pre-crisis)? And after 2008 
(financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis)? For this purpose were collected the 2, 5 and 
10 Y of YTM and benchmark prices since 2000 until now and tried to understand if the 
method used is an appropriated valuation method of sovereign debt risks. A statistical 
analysis was performed in order to evaluate how these yields behave during those 
periods. In order to measure the risk, it was employed VaR, a risk tool based on 
historical information, that measure the risk associated to a confidence interval in a 
certain period of time. 
Regarding the statistic analysis, the main results show that with Greek crisis the 
level of uncertainty in short term has become higher, so presumably be more favourable 
for investors to invest in long term that is less risky.  
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Concerning to covariance, by one hand, we verify that, the different YTM of 
Greece and the YTM between Greece and Portugal, tend to move in the same direction, 
as we expect. This means that there is a contagion effect between the maturities in 
Greece, for instance, the increases in spreads on shorter terms, implied increases in 
spreads on longer terms. And also for the YTM between Greece and Portugal, when 2Y 
YTM of Greece gets worse, investors assume that 5Y YTM of Portugal will also get 
worse and vice versa. By other hand, the YTM of Germany and Greece move in the 
opposite direction, which is not a surprise, this confirms the opposite situation of each 
country where Germany presents low YTM and Greece high YTM. Finally, we also 
verify that all covariance’s are dependent, which means that all six countries are not 
independent from each other, in other words, each country affects the others countries. 
Relatively to correlation, the results show two different effects. First, the refuge 
effect, which means that crisis in Greece, led to the flight of investors, who refuge their 
investments in Germany, because of lower YTM, and not in other countries within the 
PIIGS. Second, is the contagion effect on PIIGS and Germany. For PIIGS, the trend 
shows that with the crisis, the increases in spreads on shorter terms, implied increases in 
spreads on longer terms. On the contrary, the trend in Germany shows that the decreases 
in spreads on shorter terms, implied decreases in spreads on longer terms. There is also 
the contagion effect across countries, particularly between Portugal and Greece and 
between Spain and Italy. Which means, for instance, when Greece gets worse 
economically, investors assume that Portugal will also get worse and vice versa. The 
same happens between Italy and Spain. 
Relatively to the results of the VaR, there are two facts that are consistent in 
both approaches and over the period under review. First, Germany, always presents less 
VaR. Second, 95%VaR is lower than 99%VaR, because as the number of observations 
increase, VaR decrease.  
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For the three different periods analysed, almost always, VaR increased among 
these periods both for PIIGS and Germany. In 2000 to 2002, since the introduction of 
EURO, VaR presents the lower value. Between 2002 and 2008, the period prior to the 
beginning of the crisis, the VaR decreased a little, but not significantly to change the 
low risk associated with this sovereign debt.  The period of 2008 to 2012, as expected, 
presents higher values of VaR. This means that the best period to invest was in 2000 in 
shorter terms for PIIGS and longer terms for Germany. Analysing the values of VaR 
after 2012, we can concluded that VaR after the critical period of crisis starts to 
decrease. This reflects the recovering performance done by markets and therefore the 
potential loss now is lower than in the period of crisis. Between 2008 and 2012, for 
PIIGS was more favourable to invest in longer terms and for Germany in shorter terms. 
After 2012, we concluded that Germany keeps its strategy, investing in shorter terms 
and PIIGS start to change it, investing in shorter terms also, to reverse theirs 
performance.  
In terms of volatility, we concluded that this increases as the maturity increases. 
Therefore for long term the higher volatility imply higher VaR, which means that 
investors now prefer to invest in shorter terms, which is according with was observed in 
the VaR. As it was expectable Germany presents the lower volatility among all 
maturities. 
The main conclusions of this work are that PIIGS, present higher volatility, which 
means they are riskier countries, also present higher VaR and low correlation, in 
contrast to what is observed in Germany. Another conclusion reached is that the, the 
results are different depending on the period and country. Between 2000 and 2012, for 
Germany was more favourable the longer terms to invest, while for PIIGS was more 
favourable short terms to invest. However, we verify a different trend between 2012 and 
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2013. Since the potential loss is higher on long term, is more favourable to invest in 
shorter terms, also for PIIGS and Germany. 
5.1 Limitations 
Some limitations in the beginning of this work were the lack of studies done on 
this subject using the VaR method. Once there is a lot of data for Bonds, in the 
beginning was difficulty to understand exactly which data would be better to use and 
consequently collecting the data from the different sources. 
5.2 Future investigation 
Since this study allows understand what is the risk perception between 2000 to 
2013, it would also be interesting to remake the same study using other models of VaR, 
like Monte Carlo Simulation and compare if results are similar or not to those achieved 
with this work. Or, it would also be interesting to remake the same study using other 
model and other type of data. 
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Table VI- Conceptual Framework 
Authors/ Year Model Country Period under 
analysis 
Type of maturities 
considered 
Variables 
Gapen M., Gray D., 







Emerging countries   Sovereign bond spreads, spreads 
on sovereign credit default swaps 
(CDS) and implied probabilities 
from CDS markets. 
Benjamin Bruder, 
Pierre Hereil, Thierry 
Roncalli 
(2011) 
SABR model Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, 
Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. 
2008-2011  Measure sovereign credit risk in a 
fixed income portfolio, 
Silvia Sgherri and Edda 
Zoli (2009) 
Econometric model Germany- EU countries 2003-2009 10-year sovereign 
bonds; 
Spreads between yields 
António Afonso, 




Econometric model Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 




 Are assessed the role of a set of 
potential spread’s determinants of 
European government bond yield 
spreads against Germany. Before, 
during and after the onset of debt 
crisis. 
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António Afonso& Ana 
Sofia Nunes 
(2012) 






Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Sweden. 
1999:1-2012:1 10-year sovereign 
bond yields 
 
Emanuele Baldacci and 
Manmohan S. Kumar 
(2010) 
 
Econometric model Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Colombia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Philippines, Portugal, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, United 
States, Venezuela and 
Bolivarian Rep. 
1980-2008 Long –term sovereign 
bond yield 
Emanuele Baldacci and 




Yothin Jinjarak (2011) 
 Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain 
2005-2010 3, 5 and10-year CDS 
spreads 
Sovereign credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads 
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Table VII - Descriptive Statistics (2000-2012) 
 
Source: Own computations.
HOW DID THE PUBLIC DEBT RISK OF THE PIIGS (PORTUGUESE, IRELAND, ITALY, GREECE AND SPAIN) PROGRESSED COMPARED TO GERMANY FOR DIFFERENT YIELDS, 
BETWEEN 2000 AND 2013? 
 
 38 
Table VII- Covariance Matrix (2008- 2012) 
 
Source: Own computations. 
 
Table VIII- Correlation Matrix (2008- 2012) 
 
Source: Own computations. 
Ireland
2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y
2y 27,70559
5y 23,97079 22,5389
10y 15,77002 15,12767 10,5825
2y 14,14952 11,75908 7,210061 12,25067
5y 11,27258 9,607131 5,962457 9,581032 8,362995
10y 7,779882 7,269452 5,148697 5,865031 4,716992 4,214313
2y 5,018594 4,286577 2,906994 2,58677 2,015774 1,373342 1,27637
5y 4,537261 4,080505 2,842018 2,166123 1,797583 1,314478 1,14903 1,102665
10y 3,352045 3,132892 2,215505 1,436038 1,242166 0,981082 0,825571 0,82268 0,641898
2y 199,665 244,1344 201,7191 2,475712 21,42986 75,40803 43,51811 53,84275 47,21017 8228,323
5y 61,85207 70,00615 56,27162 9,295345 11,556 23,11927 13,39606 15,37384 13,04272 2031,199 514,0808
10y 38,44316 37,6045 27,17192 13,31865 11,35715 11,16705 7,884666 7,843124 6,2567 625,9738 169,9285 80,41979
2y 3,747346 3,448637 2,548395 2,153772 1,684973 1,568924 0,970574 0,903914 0,654049 51,73245 14,89231 6,885394 1,045549
5y 3,318491 3,215828 2,434549 1,968597 1,61151 1,585142 0,865151 0,850611 0,631344 56,2547 15,61407 6,490285 0,980392 0,974145
10y 2,877804 2,934215 2,266413 1,517815 1,311335 1,41631 0,713511 0,738393 0,571742 59,6893 16,02462 6,142148 0,838633 0,855476 0,788791
2y -0,97795 -1,12626 -1,00124 0,347324 0,290723 -0,18715 -0,23158 -0,26403 -0,23352 -43,3934 -10,866 -3,49349 -0,26965 -0,26093 -0,2797 0,32337
5y -1,77294 -1,9147 -1,62648 0,01839 0,0255 -0,52502 -0,40232 -0,43215 -0,36386 -61,8459 -15,7316 -5,22783 -0,4597 -0,44829 -0,45729 0,422833 0,593392











2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y 2y 5y 10y
2y 1
5y 0,959251 1
10y 0,920989 0,979516 1
2y 0,76803 0,707664 0,633235 1
5y 0,740558 0,699756 0,633797 0,946567 1
10y 0,719989 0,745885 0,770974 0,816257 0,794549 1
2y 0,843937 0,799201 0,790973 0,654168 0,616982 0,592144 1
5y 0,820896 0,818513 0,831976 0,589361 0,591952 0,609773 0,968548 1
10y 0,794865 0,823656 0,850052 0,512098 0,536125 0,596498 0,912081 0,977859 1
2y 0,418179 0,566901 0,683593 0,007798 0,081693 0,404947 0,424645 0,565262 0,649601 1
5y 0,518268 0,65036 0,762921 0,11713 0,176243 0,496701 0,522966 0,645721 0,717992 0,9876 1
10y 0,81443 0,883267 0,931418 0,424325 0,437932 0,606588 0,77824 0,832886 0,870825 0,769518 0,835736 1
2y 0,696254 0,71041 0,766126 0,601794 0,569823 0,747423 0,840172 0,841847 0,798372 0,557744 0,642354 0,750888 1
5y 0,638771 0,686301 0,75825 0,569856 0,564599 0,782335 0,775875 0,820724 0,798401 0,628335 0,697732 0,733281 0,971439 1
10y 0,615597 0,695896 0,784448 0,488268 0,510566 0,776809 0,711101 0,791744 0,803501 0,740901 0,795776 0,771184 0,923461 0,975922 1
2y -0,32673 -0,41718 -0,54125 0,174504 0,176787 -0,16032 -0,36047 -0,44217 -0,51256 -0,84124 -0,84276 -0,68506 -0,46375 -0,4649 -0,55382 1
5y -0,43726 -0,52356 -0,64906 0,006821 0,011447 -0,33201 -0,46229 -0,53424 -0,58956 -0,88508 -0,90071 -0,75678 -0,58363 -0,58962 -0,6684 0,965269 1
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Figure 3- Sovereign Yield Spreads 10Y evolution 
 
Source: Own computations. 
 
Figure 4- Volatility of all maturities (2Y, 5Y and 10Y) for all countries 
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